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Abstract
In the recent decade, capital outﬂows from emerging economies, in the form of a demand
for liquid assets, have played a key role in the context of global imbalances. In this paper,
we model the demand for liquid assets by ﬁrms in a dynamic open-economy macroeconomic
model. We ﬁnd that the implications of this model are very diﬀerent from standard models,
because the demand for foreign bonds is a complement to domestic investment rather than a
substitute. We show that this complementarity is at work when an emerging economy is on its
convergence path or when it has a higher TFP growth rate. This framework is consistent with
global imbalances and with a number of stylized facts such as high corporate saving rates in
high-growth, high-investment, emerging countries.
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1 Introduction
A striking feature of global capital ﬂows in the recent decade has been the increased demand
for liquid assets by emerging economies, especially emerging Asia. While the policy focus has
been on the central bank accumulation of reserves, there are more fundamental underlying
forces leading to global imbalances. In particular, it is interesting to notice that the increase
in the demand for liquid assets has been accompanied by an increase in corporate saving in
emerging Asia. Figure 1 shows the recent evolution of corporate saving for a subset of Asian
countries.1 The GDP-weighted average corporate saving was 14.6% in 2004-2008 compared to
9.8% in the 1993-2003 period for the six countries included in Figure 1 (the simple average
was 10.8% compared to 7.3% over the same periods). The recent period coincided with a
substantial increase in foreign bond holdings. For example, holdings of US Treasury securities
in these six countries increased as a proportion of GDP and went from 8.9% of their GDP at
the end of 2003 to 12.0% in December 2008.
The objective of this paper is to propose an explanation for the link between high corpo-
rate saving and the demand for liquid assets in the context of global imbalances. We model
explicitly the demand for liquid assets by ﬁrms in an inﬁnite horizon economy with a low
level of ﬁnancial development. We consider both a small open economy and an asymmetric
two-country framework composed of an industrial country and an emerging country. We show
that, due to the lower ﬁnancial development, the emerging country has a demand for liquidity
that can generate net capital outﬂows. This demand is more likely to arise in periods of fast
productivity growth.
We follow the vast literature on liquidity, where liquid assets are needed in some stages of
the production process. We show that in an open economy where liquidity is used to ﬁnance
working capital, the demand for foreign bonds is a complement to domestic investment. This
complementarity is in sharp contrast with standard intertemporal models where capital and
foreign bonds are substitutes. Consider for example an increase in domestic productivity
growth. In standard models, this implies an increase in investment associated with a decline in
foreign bonds through borrowing. This tends to imply a current account deﬁcit. On the other
hand, a model with liquidity demand implies an increase in foreign bonds holdings following a
1The corporate saving data comes from Sonali et al. (2009). We are grateful to these authors for providing
us with the data.
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productivity shock. This means that stronger growth may lead to a current account surplus.
The model's implications are consistent with the recent episode of global imbalances, with
capital ﬂowing from emerging Asia to the U.S. This can explain the decline in global interest
rates, which is often attributed to a "saving glut". Moreover, the model is consistent with
several additional facts. First, this period coincides with episodes of high growth and high
investment levels in Asia. Table 1 shows that the GDP-weighted average growth rate is 8.5%,
while the average investment rate is 37%. Second, the current account and growth in emerging
Asia are positively correlated in the period 2004-2008. Table 1 shows that, for the six countries
of Figure 1, the average correlation is 0.4, while the pooled correlation is 0.31.2 More generally,
the fastest-growing countries export capital instead of attracting it, as pointed out by Lucas
(1990), and more recently by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009). Sandri (2010) also documents
that episodes of growth acceleration are accompanied by net capital outﬂows. Third, saving
is positively correlated with growth (e.g., see Attanasio et al., 2000). As we will argue, the
existing literature cannot explain all these features simultaneously.
The demand for liquid assets comes from inﬁnitely lived credit-constrained entrepreneurs
who have investment projects that last two periods. Entrepreneurs need to install their capital
one period before producing, so capital is a long-term asset while bonds are short-term assets. In
the period where entrepreneurs install their capital, they anticipate a need for funds (working
capital) to operate their ﬁrms, e.g., to hire labor. If entrepreneurs are credit constrained
for their future working capital, they will need to save in liquid bonds at the same time as
they invest in capital. Since bonds are used to ﬁnance inputs that are imperfect substitutes
to capital, this creates a complementarity between capital and liquid assets. In contrast, if
entrepreneurs are unconstrained, they can borrow their working capital and have no need for
liquidity. This liquidity motive is generated by a production structure, with time-to-build and
working capital, that can be naturally incorporated in a dynamic macroeconomic model.3 We
assume that entrepreneurs have an investment project every other period and that at each
period half the entrepreneurs have a new project.
2This can be compared to a pooled correlation of -0.04 if we look at a larger sample of 62 emerging and
developing countries over the same period 2004-2008.
3The assumptions of time-to-build and working capital are often made in macroeconomic models. For
example, see Gilchrist and Williams (2000) for multi-period investment projects and Christiano et al. (2010)
for working capital to pay for the wage bill.
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While our model is built to study macroeconomic questions which have hardly been ad-
dressed in the literature on liquidity, it shares many features with previous work. In particular,
as in Holmstrom and Tirole (2001), the lack of pledgeability of future output is crucial to
generate a demand for liquid assets.4 In a dynamic macro context, our demand for liquidity is
in the spirit of Woodford (1990), where entrepreneurs receive high productivity projects on al-
ternating dates. It is also in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), where entrepreneurs have
a ﬁfty percent probability of receiving a high productivity shock. Our production structure
is diﬀerent and does not assume productivity heterogeneity across agents. The only source of
heterogeneity is the existence of two groups of entrepreneurs who start projects at alternating
dates.
Our contribution is also related to a growing literature introducing credit market imperfec-
tions in open economy models.5 In particular, Song et al. (2010) model a capital outﬂow with
ﬁrm heterogeneity speciﬁc to the Chinese economy. However, their focus is on growth and they
do not introduce a demand for liquidity.
The recent literature has proposed two main explanations for the net capital outﬂows from
emerging markets. First, emerging markets have a limited supply of ﬁnancial assets (e.g.,
Dooley et al., 2005, Matsuyama, 2007, Ju and Wei, 2006, 2007, Caballero et al., 2008, and
Aguiar and Amador, 2009). Second, net capital outﬂows result from precautionary saving due
to idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Mendoza et al., 2009, Sandri, 2010, Angeletos and Panousi, 2010,
Benhima, 2010). However, the fact that recent imbalances involve mainly liquid assets has only
received limited attention. Moreover, in precautionary saving models, global imbalances are
associated with a decline in investment, which is counterfactual in the case of emerging Asia.
The reason is that the demand for bonds comes from a preference for safe assets as opposed to
risky capital so that bonds and capital are still substitutes.6 In contrast, with a liquidity need
a net capital outﬂow will be associated with higher productivity and higher investment. To
4Most of the literature following Holmstrom and Tirole (2001) is cast in a microeconomic setup with two
or three periods. However, Aghion et al. (2010) present a dynamic macroeconomic model where entrepreneurs
hoard in the perspective of future liquidity shocks.
5Earlier contributions include Aghion et al. (2004) and Gertler and Rogoﬀ (1990).
6In Mendoza et al. (2009) and especially Mendoza et al. (2007), excess saving generated by risk is diverted
from domestic capital to foreign assets which leads to a decrease in investment. While Benhima (2010) shows
that with investment risk growth is associated with capital outﬂows in the long run, Angeletos and Panousi
(2010) show that ﬁnancial liberalization still coincide with a decrease in investment on impact.
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draw a sharp contrast with the impact of precautionary saving, we consider a model without
uncertainty.
To better explain the model's mechanism we ﬁrst examine the behavior of entrepreneurs in
partial equilibrium when they are either constrained or unconstrained. We show that credit-
constrained entrepreneurs have a demand for liquidity and examine the properties of this
demand. Then we incorporate these entrepreneurs in a dynamic small open economy and
examine its dynamics and steady state. We extend the analysis to a two-country general
equilibrium model, assuming that entrepreneurs in one country, the Emerging country, are
constrained and those in the other country, the Industrial country, are unconstrained. We
derive analytical results in a simple benchmark case and then provide numerical results in
more general cases.
We show that the demand for liquidity arises whenever the emerging economy is credit
constrained. When the emerging country has the same rate of impatience as the rest of the
world, it is not constrained in the steady state since entrepreneurs are inﬁnitely lived. But we
show that credit constraints still emerge in three distinct situations: i) in its convergence path
towards its unconstrained steady state; ii) in a steady state where TFP growth is permanently
higher than in other countries; iii) with temporary increases in TFP growth. While the ﬁrst
two situations can be studied analytically, we use numerical simulations to examine tempo-
rary shocks. Importantly, we do not assume that the emerging country is more impatient by
imposing diﬀerent preferences (diﬀerent discount factors). The emerging country is credit con-
strained because its higher growth rate makes it endogenously more impatient. We ﬁnd that
in all these situations, the model matches the various facts mentioned above. Indeed, when
a country experiences high growth, it becomes constrained which makes capital and foreign
assets complementary. This generates a positive correlation between growth, investment and
capital outﬂows.
Although these results are derived in a stylized framework, we consider several extensions
to show that the basic mechanism holds in a wider context. For example, we discuss whether it
holds with additional precautionary saving due to uncertainty. Moreover, we suggest that the
demand for liquid assets by entrepreneurs can be consistent with an accumulation of reserves
by the central bank when there are capital controls. We also show that the demand for liquid
assets can coincide with FDI inﬂows, thereby generating two-way capital ﬂows.
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In the next section we describe the mechanism leading to the demand for liquidity by credit-
constrained entrepreneurs. Section 3 presents the small open economy model and Section
4 describes the two-country analysis. Section 5 examines various extensions and Section 6
concludes.
2 Entrepreneurs and the Demand for Liquidity
We ﬁrst consider entrepreneurs in a partial equilibrium setup. This allows us to clearly under-
stand the mechanism behind the demand for liquid assets. There are basically three ingredients
in the model that are necessary to generate a demand for liquidity. First, production takes
time: capital needs one installation period before it can be used in the production process. Sec-
ond, a portion of the wage bill has to be paid before output is available to entrepreneurs. This
generates a need for funds. The third assumption is that entrepreneurs face credit constraints.
This implies that entrepreneurs are not always able to borrow all the funds needed to hire labor
for production. Consequently, when they invest in capital, entrepreneurs need to keep liquid
assets. The fact that liquid assets are used to ﬁnance a production factor (here, labor) that is
imperfectly substitutable with capital generates a complementarity between these assets and
capital.
In this section, we focus on the demand for liquidity by entrepreneurs. In particular, we
study how they allocate their saving between capital and liquidity. We ﬁrst describe the optimal
behavior of entrepreneurs in a general setup. We then focus on a benchmark case that allows
us to derive analytical results on the demand for liquidity.
2.1 The production process
Entrepreneurs are inﬁnitely lived and maximize the present value of their utility. They have
two-period production projects as it takes one period to install capital before producing. An
entrepreneur starting a project at time t invests Kt+1. At t + 1, once capital is installed, he
hires labor lt+1 to produce Yt+1 = K
α
t+1(At+1lt+1)
1−α, where At measures productivity, and
pays a fraction κ of wages wt+1lt+1. This production is available only at t + 2. At t + 2,
the entrepreneur pays the remaining wages and gets another investment opportunity. The
entrepreneur also consumes ct each period and can borrow or lend short-term bonds Bt with a
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gross interest rate rt.
In this setup, working capital in the form of early payment of wages (high κ) and credit
constraints interact to generate a demand for liquidity. Entrepreneurs can use part of the
proceeds from previous production to invest Kt+1 and pay the remaining wages at t. At
t + 1, however, they have no income to pay κwt+1lt+1 for workers. Consequently, they have
an incentive to borrow −Bt+2. When an entrepreneur is credit-constrained, however, he will
not be able to borrow the desired amount to pay for the wage bill. He will therefore have a
demand for liquidity at time t in the form of a positive demand for bonds, Bt+1. When the
entrepreneur is unconstrained, there is no need for liquidity at time t.
2.2 Optimal Behavior
Entrepreneurs maximize: ∞∑
s=0
βs ln(cs) (1)
Consider an entrepreneur who invests every other period, starting at time t . Denote by Wt his
initial income at time t. It is made of the output from production initiated at date t−2, Yt−1 =
Kαt−1(At−1lt−1)1−α, and of the return from bond holdings, rtBt. Hence, Wt = Yt−1 + rtBt. His
budget constraint at t and t+ 1 are:
Wt = ct + (1− κ)wt−1lt−1 +Kt+1 +Bt+1 (2)
rt+1Bt+1 = ct+1 + κwt+1lt+1 +Bt+2 (3)
The income of the entrepreneur at date t is allocated to consumption, ct+1, the remaining
wages (1 − κ)wt−1lt−1, investment in a new project, Kt+1, and bond holdings Bt+1. In the
following period, at t + 1, the only income is the bond return, rt+1Bt+1. This has to pay for
consumption ct+1 and part of the wage bill κwt+1lt+1. Typically the entrepreneur will borrow,
so that at the optimum Bt+2 ≤ 0.
The entrepreneur might face a credit constraint at date t+1. Due to standard moral hazard
arguments, a fraction 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 of capital has to be used as collateral for bond repayments:7
rt+2Bt+2 ≥ −φKt+1 (4)
7There could be a similar constraint at date t, but one can show that it is never binding, precisely because
of the demand for liquidity.
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Let λt+1 denote the multiplier associated with this constraint. The entrepreneur's program
yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
α
(
Kt+1
At+1lt+1
)α−1
= rt+1rt+2
(
1 +
λt+1ct+2
β
(
1− φ
rt+1rt+2
))
(5)
(1− α)
(
Kt+1
At+1lt+1
)α
= w˜t+1
[
κrt+2
(
1 +
λt+1ct+2
β
)
+ (1− κ)
]
(6)
ct+1
ct
= βrt+1 (7)
ct+2
ct+1
= βrt+2
(
1 +
λt+1ct+2
β
)
(8)
The credit constraint (4) introduces three wedges in the optimal decisions. First, from equation
(5), when λt+1 = 0, the marginal return of capital invested at t should be equal to the return
of one unit invested over two periods in the bond, as capital is immobile for two periods.
But when λt+1 > 0, the constraint is binding at t + 1, which implies that the entrepreneur
is unable to ﬁnance the wage bill associated with the ﬁrst-best capital stock. This creates a
wedge between the return of capital and the bond return. Moreover, this wedge is decreasing in
φ
rt+1rt+2
, which is the relative liquidity value of capital as compared to the bond. Second, from
equation (6), when λt+1 = 0, the marginal return of labor should be equal to its cost, which is
given by the wage rate multiplied by κrt+2+(1−κ). The cost of the fraction κ of wages that is
paid in advance is upgraded by the interest rate because it generates an opportunity cost to the
entrepreneur. When λt+1 > 0, the entrepreneur has exhausted his ﬁnancing capacities before
hiring the ﬁrst-best level of labor, which creates a wedge between the marginal productivity
of labor and the wage. Finally, when λt+1 > 0, it is more diﬃcult to transfer consumption
between period t+ 1 and t+ 2: there are excess saving at t+ 1, as equation (8) suggests.
2.3 A Benchmark Case
To derive simple analytical results for the constrained entrepreneur (λt+1 > 0), we consider a
benchmark where we make two speciﬁc assumptions: i) entrepreneurs cannot borrow: φ = 0;
ii) wages have to be paid entirely in advance: κ = 1. We examine the implications of relaxing
these assumptions in Section 3.
With log utility, it can be shown that an entrepreneur who invests at t consumes a ﬁxed
fraction of his revenue:
ct = (1− β)Wt (9)
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Using the Euler equation (7) at t , we get the following rule for consumption at t+ 1:
ct+1 = β(1− β)rt+1Wt (10)
From (2) and (9), total saving at t is:
St+1 = Bt+1 +Kt+1 = βWt (11)
Equation (11) states that total saving at t is a constant fraction of total revenues. This equation
is used to derive Bt+1. In the constrained case, we need to determine jointly Kt+1 and Bt+1.
In the unconstrained case, Kt+1 is ﬁrst found independently of Bt+1 and then Bt+1 can be
derived from (11).
To determine whether entrepreneurs are constrained or not, it is useful to look at la-
bor market conditions. Entrepreneurs are constrained (λt+1 > 0) whenever the market wage
is lower than the ﬁrst best wage. Deﬁne w˜t = wt/At the wage normalized by TFP and
ŵ(rt+1, rt+2) = (1 − α)[αα/(rαt+1rt+2)]
1
1−α its ﬁrst-best level. Entrepreneurs are constrained
when w˜t+1 < ŵt+1.
8 In that case, the entrepreneur could make inﬁnite proﬁts by increasing
the production scale, but is prevented by the binding credit constraint. If w˜t+1 = ŵt+1, the
production scale is undetermined, because of constant returns to scale. There is no reason for
the entrepreneur to be constrained in that case.
2.4 The Demand for Liquidity from Constrained Entrepreneurs
When the constraint at t+1 is binding, the availability of funds to ﬁnance the wage bill at t+1
is limited. The fraction of saving allocated to liquidity Bt+1 therefore depends on the liquidity
needs at t+ 1, wt+1lt+1. These needs are related to the amount of capital Kt+1 invested at t,
since Kt+1 and lt+1 are imperfect substitutes.
Since φ = 0, the ﬁrst-order conditions (5) and (6) give a straightforward relationship
between the liquidity needs wt+1lt+1 and capital Kt+1:
wt+1lt+1 =
1− α
α
rt+1Kt+1 (12)
To determine Kt+1 we use (3), (10), (11) with (12) to get:
Kt+1 = αβ
2Wt (13)
8This can be seen by combining ﬁrst-order conditions (5) and (6) in the benchmark case, which yields:
w˜t+1
(
1 +
λt+1ct+2
β
)1−α
= ŵ(rt+1, rt+2).
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Replacing in (11), we obtain:
Bt+1 = β(1− αβ)Wt (14)
Moreover, since φ = 0, Bt+2 = 0. From (11), it is interesting to notice that the demand for
liquidity Bt+1 is proportional to the entrepreneurs saving St+1.
The key implication of (13) and (14) is that the ratio between Bt+1 and Kt+1 is constant:
Bt+1
Kt+1
=
1− αβ
αβ
(15)
This implies that, contrary to standard models, capital and bonds are complements, because
bonds are needed to ﬁnance the wage bill, which is proportional to capital. Indeed, the bond-
capital ratio is decreasing in α, the share of capital in the value added. The higher α, the lower
the amount of bonds needed to ﬁnance labor. An important consequence of this result is that
growth in K will naturally generate growth in B, leading to so-called global imbalances.
The complementarity between liquidity and capital is in sharp contrast with the case where
entrepreneurs are unconstrained. In the unconstrained case, capital and the demand for bonds
are substitutes. Indeed, capital is determined by (5), and the demand for bonds is determined
by the amount of saving that is not used for capital, just as in standard models.
3 A Small Open Economy Model
The entrepreneurs described above are incorporated in a small open economy model. There are
two groups of entrepreneurs, with each group starting a project at alternating dates. Labor is
supplied by hand-to-mouth workers. Entrepreneurs can lend or borrow at the world interest rate
rt. We assume that the rest of the world has a constant productivity growth g
∗, a discount factor
β∗, and no ﬁnancial frictions. Hence the world interest rate is constant at r∗ = (1 + g∗)/β∗.
We assume that the small open economy is deﬁned by the benchmark, that is by φ = 0 and
κ = 1. Both hypotheses are justiﬁed by poor legal enforcement in emerging countries. The
discount factor β is the same as in the rest of the world, β = β∗, and the productivity growth
rate is gt = 1−At/At−1. After describing entrepreneurs and the labor market in this economy,
we describe the dynamics and the steady state for a constant growth rate g. Then, we examine
examples of temporary increases in growth. It will be convenient to normalize the variables by
At and denote X˜t = Xt/At.
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3.1 Two Groups of Entrepreneurs
Each entrepreneur has access to a project every two periods. There are two groups of en-
trepreneurs, each with mass one, with overlapping projects. One group of entrepreneurs gets
a project in odd periods, while the other group gets a project in even periods. The analysis
of a single entrepreneur, described in the previous section, can be easily extended by slightly
changing the notation. Denote by B˜1t+1 and B˜
2
t+1 the demands for bonds of entrepreneurs who
are respectively in their investment and in their production periods (i.e., entrepreneurs who
have started their project at time t and at time t+ 1). Then, from (14) we have:
B˜1t+1 =
β(1− αβ)
1 + gt+1
W˜t (16)
B˜2t+1 = 0 (17)
and the total demand for bonds at time t is: B˜t+1 = B˜
1
t+1 + B˜
2
t+1.
The two groups of entrepreneurs never interact on the domestic labor market, as they only
hire labor in their production period. Since the world interest rate r∗ is given, the dynamics of
the two groups can be studied independently from each other. As entrepreneurs are identical
within a given category, the behavior of the aggregate economy is obtained simply by summing
their policy functions.
3.2 Labor Market
3.2.1 Labor demand
In the previous section we showed that entrepreneurs are constrained when w˜t+1 < ŵ(r
∗, r∗) =
(1 − α)α α1−α /r∗ 1+α1−α . We simply denote ŵ(r∗, r∗) by ŵ(r∗). In this case, labor demand is
determined by the credit constraint. In the unconstrained case, labor demand is undetermined
as long as entrepreneurs have enough funds. The maximum labor demand in this case is
lt+1(W˜t, w˜t+1) =
(1− α)r∗β2W˜t
(1 + gt+1)w˜t+1
Labor demand is then described as follows:
lt+1 ∈ (0, lt+1) if w˜t+1 = ŵ (18)
lt+1 = lt+1 if w˜t+1 < ŵ (19)
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3.2.2 Labor supply
Labor is supplied domestically by a continuum of hand-to-mouth workers of mass one who do
not have access to the production technology and consume all their income: cwt = wtlt.
We assume that workers have at most 1 unit of labor to supply and that they have a
reservation wage equal to Atw. This gives the following labor supply equation:
lt ∈ (0, 1) if w˜t = w (20)
lt = 1 if w˜t > w (21)
Labor supply is inﬁnitely elastic around w˜t = w. For w˜t > w, workers supply the maximum
amount of labor (lt = 1) and their labor supply is inelastic. These diﬀerent labor supply
regimes will be especially relevant when we introduce FDI.
3.2.3 Labor market equilibrium
It is useful to examine the equilibrium in the labor market as it inﬂuences the dynamics of the
economy. There are three diﬀerent situations for labor market equilibrium that are illustrated
in Figure 2. lS represents total labor supply, while lD1 , l
D
2 and l
D
3 represent labor demand
for increasing levels of revenues W˜t. These three states of labor demand result respectively
in: (1) constrained ﬁrms with unemployment; (2) constrained ﬁrms with full employment; (3)
unconstrained ﬁrms. They are illustrated by the three equilibria (1), (2), and (3).
In case (1), entrepreneurs are too poor to hire all the workforce, even at their reservation
wage w. Therefore, the equilibrium wage is the one at which workers are indiﬀerent between
working and not working  which is precisely w¯  so the equilibrium labor hired is l¯1 < 1. In
case (2), entrepreneurs are able to hire all the workforce  so l2 = 1  but not to pay them at
their marginal productivity  so w˜2 < wˆ(r
∗). In case (3), entrepreneurs are suﬃciently rich to
oﬀer the ﬁrst-best wage to the workers, so w˜3 = wˆ(r
∗).
3.3 Dynamics and Balanced Growth Path
We now examine the dynamics and the steady state of this economy for a constant growth
rate g. We ﬁrst focus on the level of income W˜t, which is the state variable, and then on the
level of capital K˜t and bonds B˜t. We assume that the country starts with an income level, W0,
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below its steady state W˜ . We show that when g = g∗, entrepreneurs are constrained on their
convergence path and have a demand for liquidity. But they accumulate suﬃcient funds over
time to become unconstrained in the long run. On the other hand, when g > g∗ entrepreneurs
are always constrained in the long run.9 We ﬁrst characterize the steady with the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 If w <
(
r∗β
1+g
) 2
1−α
wˆ(r∗), an equilibrium where K˜t, B˜t, and W˜t are stationary
exists. Entrepreneurs are constrained in the stationary equilibrium if g > g∗ and unconstrained
if g = g∗. This equilibrium is characterized by the following:
(i) K˜t =
¯˜K =
(
α
(
β
1+g
)2) 11−α
.
(ii) B˜t =
¯˜B = 1−αβαβ
¯˜K if g > g∗ and ¯˜B is undetermined if g = g∗.
(iii) W˜t = W˜ =
¯˜Kα if g > g∗ and W˜ is undetermined if g = g∗.
The equilibrium of
¯˜B and W˜ is then unique if g > g∗.
We leave the proof of this proposition to the Appendix. We will instead focus on the
dynamics and illustrate this proposition graphically. Let us simply mention here that the
indeterminacy of ¯˜B and W˜ when g = g∗ is a typical feature of unconstrained inﬁnite-horizon
small open economies.
The dynamics depend on whether the credit constraint is binding or not and whether
there is full employment. This corresponds to the three situations described for the labor
market. Denote by W1 the threshold level of revenue where there is full employment, but
entrepreneurs are still constrained; and by W2 > W1 the threshold where entrepreneurs are
no longer constrained. This can be related to Figure 1. In case (1), W˜t < W1; in case (2),
W1 < W˜t < W2; and in case (3), W˜t > W2. The condition for the unconstrained economy and
the values for W1 and W2 are derived in the Appendix.
9The case g > g∗ is inconsistent with the small economy assumption in the steady state. However, it is still
of interest to examine this case as we will later look at an example where the economy grows temporarily faster.
An alternative would be to consider the case β < β∗, which also implies that entrepreneurs are constrained in
the steady state. While this assumption is commonly used in the literature, we do not ﬁnd it convincing to
explain international capital ﬂows by diﬀerences in preferences.
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Using the deﬁnition of W˜t, the dynamics of ﬁrms' revenues are described by:
W˜t+2 =
(
K˜αt+1l
1−α
t+1
1 + g
)
+ r∗B˜t+2 (22)
where:
K˜t+1 = min
{
αβ
(
β
1 + g
)
W˜t, Kˆ(r
∗)
}
(23)
lt+1 = min
{
1, l¯(W˜t, w)
}
(24)
B˜t+2 = max
{
0, r∗
β2
(1 + g)2
W˜t − r
∗Kˆ(r∗)
1 + g
− wˆ(r
∗)
(1 + g)
}
(25)
where Kˆ(r∗) = (α/r∗2)
1
1−α is the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient capital stock. This implies the following
dynamics in each of the three cases:
W˜t+2 =
r∗2β2
(1 + g)2
(
wˆ(r∗)
w
)1−α
W˜t in case (1) (26)
=
[
α
β2
(1 + g)2
W˜t
]α
in case (2) (27)
=
r∗2β2
(1 + g)2
W˜t in case (3) (28)
In cases (1) and (2), when W˜t < W2, entrepreneurs cannot reach the ﬁrst-best level of
capital, so that K˜t+1 = αβ
(
β
1+g
)
W˜t and B˜t+2 = 0. The diﬀerence between case (1) and case
(2) is that, in the former, there is unemployment (lt = l¯(W˜t, w)) while in the latter, all the
workforce is hired (lt = 1).
Finally, in case (3), when W˜t > W2, ﬁrms are suﬃciently rich to achieve the ﬁrst-best
level of capital K˜t+1 = Kˆ(r
∗). Besides, B˜t+2 is equal to
(
r∗ β
2
(1+g)2
W˜t − r
∗Kˆ(r∗)
1+g − wˆ(r
∗)
(1+g)
)
,
which represents the amounts of savings cumulated over two periods
(
β2
(1+g)2
r∗W˜t
)
, minus the
intertemporal, growth-adjusted, costs of production
(
r∗Kˆ(r∗)
1+g +
wˆ(r∗)
(1+g)
)
. The dynamics of W˜
depend linearly on its past values because (i) under log utility, savings are proportional to
revenues, (ii) under constant returns to scale, the return on capital is linear and, (iii) under
proﬁt maximization, the returns on capital and bonds are equalized.
Figure 3 represents the dynamics of W˜ when g = g∗. In case (1), the dynamics are linear
in W˜ , which is the result of constant returns to scale and a hyper-elastic supply of labor at
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w˜ = w. Since we assume that w < wˆ(r∗), entrepreneurs' revenues are increasing along these
dynamics. This is reﬂected in the fact that the ﬁrst part of the curve (1) is above the 45-degree
line. When entrepreneurs use the whole workforce, i.e., in case (2) where W1 < W˜t < W2,
the dynamics become concave because the marginal returns to capital are decreasing, due to a
constant labor supply. The economy reaches its steady state when W˜t reaches W2.
To better understand the dynamics, we now turn to the evolution of capital and bonds in
the convergence process. The dynamics of K˜t+1 are summarized by (23). B˜t+1 is then simply
the share of saving βW˜t/(1 + g) that is not invested in production, while B˜t+2 is given by
(25). Figure 4 shows the evolution of these three variables as a function of W˜t . The ﬁrst
striking result is that K˜t+1 and B˜t+1 move in the same direction when the entrepreneur is
constrained (W˜t < W2). This illustrates the complementarity between the two variables. This
contrasts with the unconstrained case W˜t ≥W2, where B˜t+1 moves independently from K˜t+1.
The evolution of B˜t+2 complements the analysis: B˜t+2 = 0 when ﬁrms are constrained because
they liquidate their bond holdings in t+ 1, while B˜t+2 moves independently from K˜t+1 in the
unconstrained case. This implies that when all entrepreneurs are constrained, the domestic net
foreign asset will comove with capital.
The second result from Figure 4 is that the long-run capital stock corresponds to its ﬁrst-
best level Kˆ(r∗). The reason is that the balanced growth path entails that the propensity
to save β, multiplied by the aggregate return on past saving, accommodates the growth in
investment needs 1 + g. This implies that the aggregate return on saving is equal to (1 + g)/β
on the balanced growth path. When g = g∗, this coincides with the world's interest rate r∗.
The eﬀect of credit constraints is then suppressed in the long run, because the opportunities of
arbitrage between bonds and capital vanish. Therefore, despite being constrained during the
convergence process, entrepreneurs are not constrained in the steady state.
Turning to the case g > g∗, we can see that entrepreneurs are constrained in the neighbor-
hood of ¯˜K. Figure 5 shows that W˜ < W2, i.e., the constraint is binding in the steady state.
This is because, when g > g∗, the long-term return on domestic capital (1 + g)/β is higher
than the world interest rate r∗. This means that arbitrage opportunities are left because of
the presence of binding credit constraints. The intuition for this result is that g commands
the entrepreneurs' investment needs. When g is large, entrepreneurs become constrained and
the return on their saving increases relative to the world's interest rate because they are not
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able to keep up with the continuing increase in TFP, unless the return on bonds r∗ or their
propensity to save β increase.
This last result is important. It means that a higher growth rate overturns the classical
result that entrepreneurs are eventually unconstrained. To generate credit constraints in the
long run, it is therefore not necessary to assume a lower discount factor β. A higher growth
rate plays the same role, since it increases the impatience rate of the economy (1 + g)/β. A
demand for liquidity will therefore naturally appear in countries with high growth rates.
When entrepreneurs are constrained in the steady state, there is a simple expression for
the current account and the ratio of current account to GDP is constant. Deﬁne the current
account as CAt = Bt+1 −Bt. In a constrained steady state, we ﬁnd:
CAt
Yt
=
(1− αβ)βg
(1 + g)2
(29)
Clearly, the current account surplus is permanently positive and increases with g (as long as
g < 1). A similar result can be found for the ratio of investment to GDP.
To summarize, we ﬁnd that the economy can be constrained on its convergence path or in
a steady state when g > g∗. In each case, there is a demand for liquidity that has signiﬁcant
macroeconomic implications. It implies a current account surplus generated by high corporate
saving. It also coincides with high investment levels and high output growth. All these features,
documented in the Introduction, are present in the context of global imbalances.
3.4 Experiences of Growth
Experiences of growth in emerging countries can be very diﬀerent in terms of capital ﬂows,
depending on the source of growth. Here we examine two cases that lead to radically diﬀerent
outcomes: an economy experiencing temporarily higher TFP growth and an economy expe-
riencing an improvement of its ﬁnancial development. In the ﬁrst case, there is a need for
liquidity that leads to a capital outﬂow. In the second case, the need for liquidity is reduced,
which leads to a capital inﬂow.
These two cases can be easily examined in our benchmark. In order to have a complete
assessment of the dynamics of the economy, we need to combine the TFP-adjusted variables
with the evolution of TFP, and to aggregate the two groups of entrepreneurs. We do this by
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assuming that these two groups are of equal size in terms of wealth.10 First, we examine a
TFP growth acceleration episode when φ = 0. Second, we consider an increase in φ from φ = 0
to φ large enough so the entrepreneurs are no longer constrained.
3.4.1 A temporary increase in g
We ﬁrst consider the impact of an increase in g starting from a steady state level where g = g∗.
The dynamic equations (23)-(28) hold, but with a diﬀerent growth rate g.11 In terms of
Figure 5, this implies that the economy is temporarily driven by the schedule characterized by
g > g∗. If we start from an initial steady state when g = g∗, this means that we move from an
unconstrained economy, starting at revenues level Wi, to a constrained one where the liquidity
motive becomes eﬀective. In the ﬁgure, this is represented by the convergence fromWi towards
W˜ . When the economy goes back to its initial growth rate, the economy returns to Wi.
As a numerical illustration, Figure 6 represents the eﬀect of a 1% increase in TFP growth
during 10 periods. We compare the eﬀect of this growth acceleration on an economy with
imperfect ﬁnancial markets (Constrained - Benchmark, represented by the solid lines), whose
dynamics are described by (38)-(40), to an economy with perfect ﬁnancial markets (Uncon-
strained - Benchmark, represented by the dashed lines), i.e., with φ large enough so that
entrepreneurs are never constrained and with κ = 0. In order to make the two cases compa-
rable, we set the initial steady state of bonds in the unconstrained model equal to that of the
constrained one. We consider capital, production and wages, represented as percentages from
the initial steady state; and bonds, represented as a share of initial GDP. These bonds are also
decomposed into the bond demand by entrepreneurs who are at the investment stage of their
project, B1, and the bond demand by entrepreneurs who are at the production phase, B2.
The shock occurs while the economy is in a stationary equilibrium with g = g∗ = 0.
During 10 periods, domestic TFP increases steadily until it reaches a level 10% higher than
initially. During this period, capital, production and wages increase, whether entrepreneurs are
constrained or not. When entrepreneurs face ﬁnancial frictions, however, capital accumulation
10In the constrained steady state, this is not an assumption but a result stemming from the equal number of
entrepreneurs in each group and the unique steady state. However, when we consider the convergence dynamics,
we have to make assumptions on the initial wealth of the two groups.
11The increase in g is taken as exogenous. An interesting extension of our analysis would be to consider
endogenous growth changes.
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is delayed. In that case, entrepreneurs can invest only after their revenues have suﬃciently
increased.
The main diﬀerence between the constrained and unconstrained economies lies in the reac-
tion of capital ﬂows: capital ﬂows out if entrepreneurs are constrained while it ﬂows in if they
are unconstrained. In the constrained case, they have to secure liquidity ex ante, during the
investment phase, in order to pay for the wage bill. In the unconstrained case, they can rely on
a free access to ﬁnancial markets to borrow in the production phase.12 This temporary growth
period leading to capital outﬂows from a constrained economy is clearly consistent with recent
global imbalances.
3.4.2 A permanent increase in φ
We now consider an episode of ﬁnancial liberalization, where a country suddenly increases its
level of ﬁnancial development measured by φ. Consider the extreme case of a country that
switches instantaneously from a fully constrained state (φ = 0) to an unconstrained one (φ
large), while it is converging to the steady state with g = g∗. The eﬀect of such an experiment
is straightforward and is represented in Figure 3. Assume that φ increases when revenues
are at W˜0. The stock of capital jumps permanently from the constrained level to its higher
unconstrained level Kˆ(r∗), which generates temporary growth. Bonds on the other hand, jump
permanently to a lower level, which generates capital inﬂows.
This experiment shows that reforms promoting ﬁnancial development generate a phase of
output growth with capital inﬂows (this outcome is typical in models with credit constraints).
In this case, the demand for liquidity is not the dominant mechanism. On the contrary,
domestic reforms improving the functioning of ﬁnancial markets reduce or eliminate the need
for liquidity, which enables a higher investment. Consequently, there is no systematic link
between capital ﬂows and growth and the relationship depends on the source of growth.
3.5 Calibration and Sensitivity Analysis
So far, we have used the benchmark model for its tractability. However, this benchmark model
is based on extreme assumptions: φ = 0 and κ = 1. Here, we relax these assumptions and
12Unconstrained entrepreneurs still want to borrow in the production phase despite κ = 0 since they want to
smooth consumption.
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calibrate these parameters more accurately, based on the values used in the literature and on
targets based on the data. We then explore the sensitivity of our results to the parameters.
3.5.1 Baseline calibration
First, to set κ we refer to the existing literature. We found a wide range of estimates for κ:
for example, Rabanal (2003) ﬁnds estimates equal to 0.20-0.25 for the US and the Euro area
while Ravenna and Walsh (2006) ﬁnd that κ = 1 is consistent with empirical evidence on
aggregate US data. Barth and Ramey (2001), using data for trade credit from the U.S. Flow
of Funds, report that over the period 1995-2000 net working capital (inventories plus trade
receivables, net of trade payables) averaged an amount comparable to the investment in ﬁxed
capital, which, in our model, corresponds approximately to κ = 0.5. As a middle ground, we
set κ = 0.75. As for φ, we set it so that liquidity demand to GDP, B/Y , is equal to 40%, which
is the value of gross external assets to GDP observed in our sample of six Asian countries in
2000.13 This gives φ = 0.2.
Consider now the impact of a ten-period 1% increase in growth within the calibrated model,
represented by the dotted lines in Figure 6 (Constrained - Calibrated), along with the results
of the benchmark model.14 The main features of the benchmark model, that is, the high
average demand for liquidity, the delay in the adjustment of capital and the increase in the
demand for liquidity, are muted in the calibrated model, but are still present, even with a lower
κ and a higher φ. The smaller magnitude of the demand for liquidity lies in two interconnected
facts: the lower demand for liquidity by entrepreneurs who invest (B1) and the higher debt
capacity of entrepreneurs who pay working capital (B2). The results of the benchmark case
are therefore robust to a proper calibration.
3.5.2 Sensitivity
Here we examine the sensitivity of the results to diﬀerent values of φ and κ. φ is set to 0.1 and
0.4, along with its baseline calibration value 0.2. κ is set to 0.5 and 0.9, along with its baseline
value 0.75. The results are represented in Figure 7. Since the eﬀects on capital, production
and wages are very similar across the diﬀerent calibrations, we do not represent them.
13The data on foreign assets is taken from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
14The simulations are run using Dynare (Juillard, 1996).
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A net capital outﬂow accompanies the growth increase for all the parameter values con-
sidered in Figure 7. In each case, the proportional increase in the demand for liquidity in the
investment period, B1, is signiﬁcant, while borrowing in the production period, B2, is limited.
With a higher φ it is easier to borrow in the production period (larger B2) and the demand for
liquidity in the investment period can be smaller. Similarly, a smaller κ implies a smaller B1.
Overall, however, the proportional increase in the demand for liquidity in presence of higher
growth is robust to changes in these two parameters.
4 Global imbalances
The analysis so far has been conducted by assuming that the emerging country is small, so
that the interest rate is given. However, global imbalances have been taking place in a context
where capital ﬂows from emerging countries, especially China, can inﬂuence the world interest
rate because of their size. We therefore extend our baseline small open economy to a two-
country economy. We show that the demand for liquidity in an emerging country leads to a
lower world interest rate, higher investment and output in the rest of the world, and larger
global imbalances. We show that these imbalances remain as long as the demand for liquidity
is eﬀective, in particular as long as the emerging economy has a higher TFP growth.
We consider an asymmetric world composed of an Emerging country similar to the one
studied earlier and an Industrial country with a high level of ﬁnancial development, so that
entrepreneurs are never constrained and have no need for working capital. Industrial country
variables are denoted with an asterisk, so that κ∗ = 0 and φ∗ is large. The two countries are
linked through the bond market as they can trade one-period bonds. Productivities At and A
∗
t
grow respectively at rate g and g∗. Otherwise, the two countries have the same characteristics.
We ﬁrst study a balanced growth path where the Emerging country grows at a permanently
higher growth rate than the Industrial country. Though unrealistic, the dynamics of the growth
path are informative. We can show that a permanently higher growth rate in the Emerging
country generates a permanent liquidity demand and a permanent current account surplus.
Second, we consider the case where both countries grow at the same rate in the long run but
with g temporarily larger than g∗. This experiment is simulated.
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4.1 Balanced Growth Path
The balanced growth path with g permanently higher than g∗ is characterized in the Appendix.
Let K˜∗t = K∗t /At be the Industrial capital stock normalized by Emerging TFP. Let also r˜t be
the normalized interest rate: r˜t = rt
(
A0
A∗0
) (1−α)(t+1/2)
2
. The following Proposition characterizes
a steady state where Emerging country entrepreneurs are constrained.
Proposition 2 Assume g > g∗. When t goes to inﬁnity, a growth path where entrepreneurs are
constrained and K˜t, K˜
∗
t , B˜t, and r˜t are stationary exists and is characterized by the following:
(i) K˜t =
¯˜K =
(
αβ2
(1+g)2
) 1
1−α
(ii) K˜∗t =
¯˜K∗ = 1−αβαβ
¯˜K
(iii) B˜t =
¯˜B = 1−αβαβ
¯˜K
(iv) r˜t = r˜ =
[
α
(
1−αβ
αβ
(
αβ2
(1+g)2
) 1
1−α
)α−1] 12
Steady-state Emerging capital stock and bonds are the same as in the small open economy
(see Proposition 1). Since g > g∗, the Emerging country is always constrained so that the
liquidity demand implies that capital and bonds move in parallel. The interesting new result
in the two-country economy is that the Industrial capital stock grows at the Emerging country
growth rate. Moreover, Proposition 2 implies that the "imbalance" of the Industrial country,
measured as B∗t /Y ∗t , grows more negative over time. In other words, if the Emerging country
grows permanently faster than the Industrial country, global imbalances can grow permanently.
Both countries beneﬁt from global imbalances in the steady state. Since, Industrial en-
trepreneurs are unconstrained, they are the providers of liquidity to Emerging entrepreneurs.
This enables a higher growth in the Emerging country. At the same time, Industrial en-
trepreneurs receive cheaper funding from Emerging entrepreneurs, which allows them to in-
crease their capital stock. It actually increases at the same rate as Emerging productivity.15
15It can be shown that consumption in the Industrial country also grows at a higher rate than the fundamental
growth rate g∗.
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4.2 A Temporary Increase in g
A more realistic scenario is to assume that the higher growth rate in the Emerging country
is temporary. Here, we simulate the impact of the same temporary increase in the domestic
growth rate as in the previous section. The Emerging country's TFP grows at a rate g = 1%
for 10 periods. We compare the resulting eﬀects when the Emerging country is constrained, as
in the benchmark case, and when it is unconstrained. The results are represented in Figure 8.
The reaction of the Emerging economy follows closely the reaction of the small open economy
studied in the previous section. Indeed, the entrepreneurs' liquidity motive to hold bonds
dominates the arbitrage motive. This implies that the Emerging country experiences capital
outﬂows instead of capital inﬂows, which translates into global imbalances: the debt level of
the Industrial country has to increase.
The impact on the world interest rate diﬀers dramatically in the constrained and uncon-
strained cases. In order to make the Industrial country more willing to supply bonds, the
world interest rate has to decrease in the constrained case. In the unconstrained case, on the
contrary, the interest rate increases as a response to the decrease in bond demand. As a result,
the Industrial capital stock increases in the constrained case, while the opposite happens in
the unconstrained case. In the constrained case, growth in the Emerging country is a boon for
the Industrial country, because the additional resources of Emerging entrepreneurs are partly
transferred to Industrial entrepreneurs. This contrasts with the standard unconstrained case,
where the spillover of higher growth is negative.
5 Discussion
The model has been kept simple to illustrate the mechanism behind the demand for liquidity.
But this mechanism holds in a wider context. In this section we examine four important
extensions: i) uncertainty; ii) FDI; iii) capital account liberalization; iv) public debt and
international reserves. While the basic mechanism may still hold in each of these extensions,
they each add interesting elements to the analysis.
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5.1 Uncertainty
The basic mechanism behind the demand for liquid assets arises with perfect foresight. The
presence of uncertainty introduces additional mechanisms, such as precautionary saving, af-
fecting capital ﬂows. Fully solving the model with uncertainty has to be done numerically, but
the main channels can be found from ﬁrst order conditions. Assume that there is uncertainty
about future TFP (revealed in t + 2), while entrepreneurs know the productivity of current
project (revealed in t). In this case, ﬁrst order conditions become:
α
(
Kt+1
At+1lt+1
)α−1
= r∗2
1 + λt+1
βEt
{
1
ct+2
} (1− φ
r∗2
) (30)
(1− α)
(
Kt+1
At+1lt+1
)α
= r∗wt+1
1 + λt+1
βEt
{
1
ct+2
}
 (31)
ct+1
ct
= βr∗ (32)
1
ct+1
= βr∗Et
{
1
ct+2
}
+ λt+1r
∗ (33)
The impact of uncertainty is basically similar to what is found in related models (e.g.
Mendoza et al., 2007). For example, equation (33) shows that consumption decisions are
aﬀected in a standard way that may generate precautionary saving. This eﬀect would increase
net capital ﬂows and the demand for liquid assets. With risk, the steady state wealth would be
strictly higher than the constrained level when g = g∗. However, if g > g∗, the constraint can
still be binding and the entrepreneur would have a demand for liquidity. The total impact of
uncertainty on liquidity demand is a quantitative question that should be analyzed in a fully
calibrated model (we leave this for future research).
5.2 Foreign Direct Investment
The demand for liquid assets represents the main source of capital ﬂows in the model. In
the benchmark case (when φ = 0), the demand for liquidity even equals net capital ﬂows. In
reality, however, the demand for liquid assets coexists with other types of ﬂows, because of
the limited domestic supply of liquidity. A special type of ﬂow is FDI. We can show that our
model can generate FDI inﬂows along with outﬂows of bonds. Moreover, we show conditions
under which net outﬂows can be robust to the introduction of alternative sources of ﬁnancing
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that are not subject to credit frictions. One condition is that the level of development in the
Emerging country is not too high.
A simple way of introducing FDI in our model is to assume that it is undertaken by
unconstrained investors from the Industrial country.16 However, given the simplicity of our
model this assumption may imply that unconstrained Industrial investors partially or fully
crowd out Emerging entrepreneurs. To avoid this, we make two further assumptions. First,
there is an increasing cost for Industrial entrepreneurs to invest in the Emerging country. This
cost rules out indeterminacy for the quantity of FDI in equilibrium. Second, we assume that the
Emerging country is in a situation of unemployment where workers are paid their reservation
wage w. In Figure 2, this means that we consider equilibrium (1). FDI increases total labor
demand (shifts lD1 to the right), but it has no impact on the wage rate and therefore no spillover
eﬀect to existing Emerging entrepreneurs.
More speciﬁcally, we can assume a cost τ of the iceberg type that increases with the
aggregate amount of labor used, so it is not internalized by the foreign ﬁrms. Let lF be
the amount of labor used by FDI and assume that τ = τ(lF ) with τ(0) = 0 and τ ′ > 0.17 This
implies the following labor demand by foreign ﬁrms:
lF (w˜t+1, r
∗) = τ−1
[
1−
(
w˜t+1
ŵ(r∗, r∗)
)1−α]
(34)
Similarly, we can write the labor demand by domestic ﬁrms as:
l(w˜t+1, K˜t+1, r
∗) =
(1− α)r∗
αw˜t+1
K˜t+1 (35)
where K˜t+1 is independently deﬁned by past capital and labor.
Now assume that Emerging opens to FDI when wages are at w and that FDI is not too
large so that wages do not increase. In other terms total demand at w is less than one:
lF (w, r∗) + l(w, K˜t+1, r∗) < 1 (36)
In this case, Emerging entrepreneurs are not aﬀected by FDI and keep their liquidity demand,
so that both types of capital ﬂows can coexist. As K˜t grows, however, labor demand grows
and (36) will not longer hold and we are in equilibrium like (2) in Figure 2. The wage rate has
16See Kiribaeva and Razin (2010) for a survey on diﬀerent ways to model FDI.
17This implies that the proﬁt function for FDI is pi(KFt+1, l
F
t+1) = (1 − τ)At+1KFαt+1lF1−αt+1 − rt+1rt+2KFt+1 −
rt+2wt+1l
F
t+1
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to adjust so that:
lF (w˜t+1, r
∗) + l(w˜t+1, K˜t+1, r∗) = 1 (37)
In this case, the dynamics of capital ﬂows become more complex and depend on the details of
the model.
5.3 Capital Account Liberalization
A demand for liquidity also changes the implications of a capital account liberalization. There
is an extensive literature analyzing the implications of liberalizing international capital ﬂows.
When an economy has a low level of ﬁnancial development, such a liberalization typically
implies a capital inﬂow and an increase in investment, at least in the short run.18 In contrast,
with a demand for liquidity, while there is an increase in investment there is always an initial
capital outﬂow.
To study a capital account liberalization, we simply need to analyze the Emerging econ-
omy in autarky and then examine the convergence to its open economy steady state. For an
interesting autarky equilibrium to exist, however, there must be a domestic supply of liquidity.
This would not be the case in our benchmark where φ = 0. But as long as φ > 0, there is a
well deﬁned steady state in autarky. Alternatively, we could assume that there is an exogenous
supply of public debt, BG, that oﬀers the liquidity needs. This determines a steady state
income level W˜A. If this supply is not too large, the Emerging economy will be constrained in
autarky. For example we could have W˜A = W0 and analyze the impact of a capital account
liberalization by repeating the small open economy analysis in section 3.3. On impact, the
capital stock slowly increases and is accompanied by a capital outﬂow. This is made possible
by an increase in the return on bonds. Then entrepreneurs gradually accumulate proﬁts. They
can then invest more and increase their demand for liquidity. In a two-country model, the
capital account liberalization implies an increasing current account deﬁcit in the Industrial
economy.
18E.g. see Aghion et al. (2004), Aoki et al. (2009), Bacchetta (1992), or Martin and Taddei (2010).
In Angeletos and Panousi (2010), a capital account liberalization implies an initial capital outﬂow, but is
accompanied by a decline in investment.
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5.4 The Role of Domestic Liquidity and International Reserves
In a closed economy, the government may alleviate the liquidity constraint by issuing liquid
public debt (e.g. see Woodford, 1990). This is no longer the case in an open economy with
well integrated ﬁnancial markets. In this context, entrepreneurs have ample access to liquid
assets in foreign countries and changes in the supply of domestic assets have little or no impact.
Nevertheless, there are two potential channels through which an increase in public debt might
have an impact. First, it can aﬀect the world interest rate. This channel obviously disappears
in a small open economy. Second, the increase in debt may be associated with a reduction
in taxes that have real eﬀects. Since Ricardian equivalence does not hold due to ﬁnancial
constraints, a decrease in taxes on entrepreneurs increases investment.19 However, this channel
is related to tax policy rather than changes in liquidity supply.
In contrast, with limited ﬁnancial integration, managing liquidity has a signiﬁcant impact
on investment as it aﬀects the supply available to entrepreneurs. However, the impact of
liquidity demand on net foreign assets may depend on the government's behavior. It could
actually be the same as with full capital mobility. Assume that a government issues public
debt to match a demand for liquidity and uses the funds to buy foreign assets. This may
lead to the same capital outﬂow as with full ﬁnancial integration. The government simply
plays a role of intermediary between the domestic ﬁnancial sector and foreign borrowers. This
situation actually corresponds to the recent Chinese experience (Song et al., 2010, give a similar
argument). With strong capital controls in place, the central bank has been buying substantial
amounts of international reserves, while at the same time it has been issuing domestic debt.
In other terms, with capital controls the increase in the central bank foreign exchange reserves
may simply reﬂect the demand for liquidity by the private sector.
19A decrease in taxes in either stage of production increases the funds available to investors and leads to
more investment. In terms of the demand for liquidity, a tax decline in the investment stage increases the
demand for liquidity, while a tax decline in the production stage decreases the demand for liquidity. This
implies that changing the tax proﬁle (between the investment and the production stages) may aﬀect liquidity
demand without aﬀecting investment.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a simple mechanism generating a demand for liquid assets in a
dynamic small open macroeconomic model. This demand emanates from ﬁrms and is propor-
tional to their saving. Such a demand can generate a current account surplus in fast-growing
emerging economies, where ﬁrms face tighter credit constraints. In such a context, the demand
for foreign bonds becomes a complement to investment. This implies that an increase in growth
and in investment is accompanied by a net capital outﬂow, which is the opposite from the pre-
dictions of the standard intertemporal model. We show that the demand for liquidity can arise
on the convergence path of an economy with an initial low level of capital. It can also occur
close to a steady state, if the economy grows faster than the rest of the world (temporarily or
permanently).
When we cast this mechanism in a two-country model, it gives a framework consistent with
global imbalances and with all the symptoms observed in a "saving glut". Both countries beneﬁt
from these imbalances. On the one hand, the Emerging country can grow faster thanks to the
liquidity provided by the unconstrained Industrial country. On the other hand, the Industrial
country can build a higher capital stock thanks to the funds provided by the Emerging country.
In addition to a sustained current account surplus in the Emerging economy, the model is
consistent with a number of stylized facts observed in recent years. In particular, current
account surpluses have been accompanied by a large level of corporate saving, a large level of
investment, and rapid growth in emerging Asia. The existing literature cannot explain these
facts jointly. Moreover, the model is consistent with the empirical evidence on the allocation
puzzle and with the positive correlation between saving and growth. We also argue that the
framework can be consistent with an increase in reserves, as is observed in China and other
countries, when there are capital controls and the central bank plays the role of intermediary
between the private sector and the international asset market. Moreover, we showed that the
demand for liquid assets can also coincide with FDI inﬂows.
This paper has focused on a speciﬁc mechanism that may play an important role in some
episodes. However, we have abstracted from many other factors that aﬀect capital ﬂows.
Moreover, we have shown that even in our simple model there could be episodes of high
growth accompanied by net capital inﬂows, as a consequence of ﬁnancial deepening. This
illustrates the fact that the demand for liquidity mechanism we have explored in this paper is
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not always at work or not always the dominant factor. A natural extension of this research
is to attempt to identify the conditions under which this mechanism can or has been relevant
(besides the current global imbalance episode). The other natural extension is to introduce the
basic mechanism in a more complete model. For example, the process for growth has been kept
exogenous, but it could be interesting to examine the interaction between endogenous growth
and the demand for liquidity. A more complete and realistic model would allow a quantitative
evaluation that might prove useful in the ongoing discussion on global imbalances.
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7 Appendix: Dynamics and Steady State in the Benchmark
Case
7.1 Small open economy
First it is convenient to deﬁne three auxiliary variables. Deﬁne β̂ =
(
β
1+g
)2
, ĝ =
(
1+g
1+g∗
)2
, and
ŵ = w(1−α)r∗ . In order to prove the existence and unicity of the steady state, we establish the
following lemma:
Lemma 1 If w < wˆ(r∗), the entrepreneurs' revenues W˜ in the emerging country evolve ac-
cording to:
W˜t+2 = (αŵ)
α−1 αβ̂W˜t if W˜t < W1 (38)
=
[
αβ̂W˜t
]α
if W1 ≤ W˜t < W2 (39)
=
W˜t
ĝ
if W˜t ≥W2 (40)
with W1 = ĝŵ and W2 = Kˆ(r
∗)αĝ.
Proof:
If w < wˆ(r∗), which means that the ﬁrst-best wage is higher than the reservation wage, then
there is no unemployment when the ﬁrms are unconstrained. Only three situations can then
exist, as represented in Figure 2 (1) Constrained ﬁrms with unemployment; (2) Constrained
ﬁrms with full employment; (3) Unconstrained ﬁrms with full employment. The diﬀerent
dynamic equations for W correspond to these diﬀerent types of equilibria in the labor market.
1. In the equilibrium with unemployment, entrepreneurs are constrained, so K˜t+1 = αβ̂W˜t
and the dynamics of revenues follow:
W˜t+2 =
[
αβ̂W˜t
]α
l1−αt+1 (41)
But this equation is conditional on lt+1. In order to determine the aggregate employment
level lt+1, we use (12):
lt+1 =
K˜t+1
αŵ
(42)
Replacing lt−1 in (41), the dynamics of K˜ are fully characterized:
W˜t+2 = (αŵ)
α−1 αβ̂W˜t (43)
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These dynamics hold as long as lt+1 < 1, that is: K˜t+1 = αβ̂W˜t < αŵ. Otherwise,
entrepreneurs are either constrained with full employment or unconstrained. This is
equivalent to W˜t < W1, with W1 = ĝŵ.
2. In the equilibrium with constrained ﬁrms and full employment, the dynamics of revenues
obey to (41) with lt+1 = 1, which yields (39).
3. When ﬁrms are unconstrained, the dynamics of revenues must satisfy:
W˜t+2 = r
∗B˜t+2 +
r∗2
α(1 + g)
Kˆ(r∗) (44)
with B˜t+2 = r
∗
[
β̂W˜t − Kˆ(r
∗)
α(1+g)
]
. Hence (40).
The ﬁrst-best capital stock Kˆ(r∗) is implementable only if it is lower than the constrained
level of capital: Kˆ(r∗) ≤ αβ̂W˜t., which is equivalent to W˜t ≥W2, with W2 = Kˆ(r∗)αĝ.20
Proof of Proposition 1
We examine the diﬀerent dynamic equations summarized in Lemma 1 in order to determine
the steady state(s):
1. According to Lemma 1, if W˜t < W1, then the dynamics of W˜ follow (38). As a result,
W˜t+2 > W˜t is equivalent to (αŵ)
α−1
[
αβ̂
]
> 1, which implies the following condition on
w: w < ĝ
1
1−α wˆ(r∗).
2. Similarly, if W1 ≤ W˜t < W2, then the dynamics of W˜ follow (39). Consequently, W˜t+2 >
W˜t if and only if W˜t <
(
αβ̂
) α
1−α
.
Besides, if g > g∗, then
(
αβ̂
) α
1−α ∈ [W1,W2). In that case, there exists a unique
ﬁxed point ¯˜W =
(
αβ̂
) α
1−α
to the dynamic equation of capital in the interval where
entrepreneurs are constrained. If g = g∗, then
(
αβ̂
) α
1−α 6∈ [W1,W2) . There is no ﬁxed
point in this interval.
3. Finally, if W˜t ≥ W2, then any W˜t is stationary if g = g∗, since W˜t+2 = W˜t. If g > g∗,
then W˜t+2 < W˜t, and there is no ﬁxed point in this interval.
20It can be checked that W1 < W2 whenever w < wˆ(r
∗).
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To sum up, when g = g∗, any W˜ ≥W2 is a steady state. This steady state is characterized
by K˜t+1 = Kˆ(r
∗) and B˜t+1 = β1+gW˜ − Kˆ(r∗). For g > g∗, there is a unique steady state
¯˜W =
(
αβ̂
) α
1−α
. This steady state is characterized by K˜t+1 =
αβ2
1+g
¯˜W and B˜t+1 =
β(1−αβ)
1+g
¯˜W .
7.2 Two-country economy
We assume that 0 ≤ g∗ < g, so the Emerging country grows faster than the Industrial coun-
try. In this case, when entrepreneurs are constrained, the dynamic equation for the emerging
country is the following:
K˜t+1 = αβ̂K˜
α
t−1 (45)
On the other hand, the industrial country's capital must satisfy:
α
(
At
A∗t
K˜∗t
)−(1−α)
= rtrt+1 (46)
Proof of Proposition 2: We conjecture that such a stationary growth path exists and
then we verify that it satisﬁes (i)-(iv), and that the Emerging country would indeed stay
constrained under (i)-(iv).
If the emerging country is constrained, then (45) holds. The stationary solution for K˜
is
(
αβ̂
) 1
1−α
, hence (i). (iii) derives directly from the relationship of Bt and Kt when the
entrepreneurs are constrained. In order to determine the stationary values of r˜t and K˜
∗
t ,
consider the aggregate dynamics of the Industrial country:
B1∗t+1 +B
2∗
t+1 +K
∗
t+1 = βrt
[
(B1∗t +B
2∗
t ) + rt−1K
∗
t−1 −
(1− β)K∗t
β
]
(47)
where B1∗ are bonds held by entrepreneurs who invest in t and B2∗ are bonds held by en-
trepreneurs who invested in t− 1.
Equilibrium in the international bond market yields:
K∗t+1 −Bt+1 = βrt
[
−Bt + rt−1K∗t−1 −
(1− β)K∗t
β
]
(48)
Dividing by K∗t+1, we obtain:
1− B˜t+1
K˜∗t+1
= βrt
[
−(1 + g) B˜t
K˜∗t
K˜∗t
K˜∗t+1
+ (1 + g)2
rt−1K˜∗t−1
K˜∗t+1
− (1 + g)(1− β)K˜
∗
t
βK˜∗t+1
]
(49)
(iv) implies that r goes to zero when t goes to inﬁnity. Using this and the fact that B˜ and K˜∗
are stationary , this equation yields that ¯˜K∗ = ¯˜B, hence (ii). (iv) derives directly from (46)
and (ii).
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In order to prove that this deﬁnes an equilibrium where the Emerging country is constrained,
it is suﬃcient to show that ¯˜K is lower than the level of capital per eﬃcient unit of labor that
would prevail absent credit constraints with the given interest rate. This level is given by ¯˜K∗ AtA∗t ,
which goes to inﬁnity when t is large. This conﬁrms that the emerging country is constrained.
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Table 1
Growth, Investment and Current Account - 2004-2008
Country Growth-Current Account GDP Growth Investment/GDP
Correlation Average, % Average
China 0.44 10.8 0.43
India 0.69 8.5 0.35
Korea 0.42 4.2 0.30
Philippines 0.47 5.5 0.15
Taiwan 0.09 4.6 0.22
Thailand 0.25 4.7 0.28
GDP-weighted 8.5 0.37
Simple average 0.40 6.4 0.29
Pooled correlation 0.31
Source: World Bank and National Statistics Taiwan
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Figure 4: Convergence with g = g∗
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